Peirce's architectonics, far from rigid, is bended by many plastic transformations, deriving from the cenopythagorean categories, the pragmaticist (modal) maxim, the logic of abduction, the synechistic hypotheses and the triadic classification of sciences, among many other tools capable of molding knowledge. Plasticity, in turn, points to interlacements between mathematics and art, and shapes some associated conceptual forces in the boundary of the disciplines: variation, modulation and invariance; transformability, continuity and discreteness; creative emergence.
THE MANUSCRIPT: CREATIVE REASON AND PLASTIC IMAGINATION
The Logic Notebook (LN) is a notebook 1 where Peirce annotated chronologically (1865-some consistent final results, the ones that are circulated to the community of inquirers.
The LN allows, instead, to track many intermediate modulations between Peirce's initial, abductive guesses and its posterior, better achieved expressions. A register of practices of the scientist emerges, with explicit marks in the process of discovery. Through advances day by day, in some cases, and with sudden bursts of imagination, in other cases, the LN yields a genuine vision of the creative web. In fact, the LN -true index of invention-can be understood as an exceptional plastic register of obstructions (2), openings (1) and transits (3), where the esthetic freshness of the annotations confirms the so-called logic of research: combination of problems ("walls" in the original Greek) (2), regulating hypotheses (1), trial and error tests (2) and partial proofs (3).
The great critic and historian of art, Pierre Francastel, has underscored forcefully how mathematics and art should be understood as the two major polarities of human thought. Beyond mathematics and art, Francastel observed, in turn, the emergence of creative webs with multisorted mixtures: real and ideal, concrete and abstract, rational and sensible. A mediating system if there is one, Peirce's architectonics helps to calibrate those gluings between reason and imagination, and to situate "topographically" many of their diverse instantiations. It is well known how, in the late Peirce, esthetics becomes one of the foundations of logic [Parret 1994 ]. Imagination transforms itself into a pillar of reason, confirming Pascal's dictum: "the heart has its reasons, of which reason knows nothing". The basis of Peirce's inversion consists in recognizing the esthetic summum bonum as a profound form of reasonableness, a sort of continuous growing of potentiality. 2 Normative sciences emerge then as progressive approximations to the summum bonum: esthetical works as first embodiments (sensibility/creativity), ethical norms as second embodiments (action/community), logical systems as third embodiments (necessity/thought). Then, everything turns out to be modulation of an archetypical force, the summum bonum, which subdetermines its further evolution.
2 "The pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable" [CP 5.433; 1905, Peirce's emphasis] .
We propose to define the continuity/plasticity dialectics through the following A fact not sufficiently emphasized, we believe that Peirce may well be considered as one of the greatest imaginative powers in the history of thought. Jakobson already signaled
Peirce's profound originality, but it is difficult not to perceive that most of his interpreters (and some of his best readers, as Murphey, Hookway, Parker or Short) lack almost completely of the needed imagination to evaluate and appreciate Peirce's inventiveness.
In that order of ideas, the absence of any monograph in English on Peirce's creativity is extremely telling (something which also points to the importance of [Barrena 2007] Peirce's annotations begin with the sentence "In short there must be a Middle
Voice" (46r, Peirce's capitals). Peirce thus sketches, since November 1868, a logic of differential mediations ("Middle Voice"), that is, an early logic of continuity, a middleway logic of "being". The multiplicity of exponentials will emerge again, years ahead, through the multiplicity of possibilia in Peirce's continuum. Peirce's writings present a fascinating series of daily progresses and retreats, calculus exercises and conceptual discussions, failed trials, erasures, crossing-outs, and permanent verbal modalities ("may", "can", "must", etc.) The inquirer fights with himself: "Here I feel myself sadly in want of a better notation", "This development does not hold", "I want some thing similar" (46v), "How the inverse should be", "My analogies so far are but remote. Still I hope they will develop into something" (47r). Since the very first pages, Peirce begins to combine notations (algebraic and diagrammatic) and to suggest analogies (relative and analytical exponentials), immersed in a mud where lights are absent but where confidence ("Still I hope") may orient new findings.
Days go by, and Peirce works with a multitude of techniques -quantifier approximations (44r), comparisons with De Morgan (a5r), algebraic developments (52v), lattice arguments (55r), Taylor's theorem (57v), differential remainders (59v), general binomial developments (60v)-until getting again insuperable obstructions ("There must be some mistake here", "I drop this here for the present" (62r)). Nevertheless, only a day later, he takes up again what was apparently left over: he discovers the reason of all complications in the non-commutative treatment of the relative differential exponential that he has been trying to introduce, and begins to elaborate a list of its peculiar properties ("I will now note all the exceptions in reference to these exponents" (62v)).
The introduction of generalized logarithms (63r-66r) helps to explain the exceptions, but the annotations finish abruptly, concluding a week of extraordinary fizziness.
A long year elapses before Peirce, on October 15 1869, writes finally his "Eureka" (see figure 1) . The exclamation is related to the conscience of an unusual state of things:
the non-commutativity and the absence of unit for certain logical first-order operations, a profound discovery, well ahead in time, which would take a century in being understood Conventions of this system of assertion expression" (105r, Peirce's crossing-out).
"Language" passes thus to a second plane. Five days later, the seventh draw is titled "Basic Formal Rules, from which, without reference to the Constitutive Conventions, all illative transformations can be deduced" (112r efforts (112r-125r) are concentrated in specifying, with great care, the "Basic Formal
Rules" of the logical system and in emphasizing repeatedly its pragmatic aspect.
A comparison of the diverse versions shows us how Peirce becomes growingly conscious of the pragmatic specificity of his system, introducing many short and beautiful proofs that illustrate the strength of the rules. All is beauty, for example, in
Theorem XIX (117r) where Peirce proves the consistency of his system (in a same region, one cannot draw simultaneously a and a ). A counterpoint harmony between erasure and insertion imposes on the Reader. In a similar vein, Theorem XXVI (120r) proposes normal forms for the quantifiers, where the breaks and gluings of the line of identity codify a very beautiful diagrammatic dance on the page (see figure 2 ). The transformation of images not only reveals underlying logical codes, but also a profound esthetic equilibrium. In Peirce's creative skills we thus observe how the scientist accepts the mud, decants it analytically, manipulates it pragmatically and, finally, finds novel synthesis. 5 In fact, we are looking to an inquirer which situates itself naturally in a middle-way between 5 The construction of a Peirce supposedly anticipating Analytic Philosophy seems to have been just an ingenuous artificial interpretation at the end of XX th century, which should have no course anymore.
analysis and synthesis (for developments see [Maddalena & Zalamea 2011] ). The transgression of any absolute perspective (either analytical or synthetic) is fundamental to allow the plasticity required by the creative mind.
(C).
Little after the first entries on existential graphs in the LN (102r-127r), Peirce embarks on another unexpected adventure, in which he tries to understand visually some metaproperties of sequences, with the objective of presenting diagrammatically the properties of natural numbers (already axiomatized algebraically in [Peirce 1881 ], see [Oostra 2003 ] for a detailed study). On August 4 1898, Peirce writes: "We now come to An Extension of Existential Graphs, permitting Abstraction", where "Abstraction consists essentially in regarding a set of things, ordered or unordered, as an individual object, and denoting it by an index" (LN, 128r). Dealing with abstractions in Beta is a daunting enterprise, that Peirce would never complete 6 , even if the discernment of the seer astonishes us: "But it is hard to define a «set» of things. Since, then, the idea of a sign is presupposed in logic, it is better to endeavor to define abstraction in terms of signs instead of sets" (128r, Peirce's emphasis), "Try to define a pair, an ordered pair. You are driven to the idea of a sign" (129r). The control of an abstraction must be, thus, the control of its signs: a simple form of asserting that the control of a concept consists in the control of its representations in formal systems, the basis of XX th century mathematics.
Peirce creates diverse signs to capture the idea of a sequence. He introduces first a new sign (sort of eagle wings, 129r) to express the ordered pair, then introduces another original sign (sort of inverted heart, 130r) to express belonging, and he begins to combine them under Beta to express order properties (August 4, first fragment of figure 3 ), sequences properties (August 5, second fragment of figure 3 ) and natural number properties (August 6, third fragment of figure 3 ). Again, we stand in front of intense days of sowing, that, without enough fertilizers, dry soon. But, even if the days of harvest were not meant to be Peirce's, it is still amazing to sense his great vision. Consequently, the emergence of triadic logic is not casual and answers partially some permanent queries of Peirce: cenopythagoreanism, modality, variation. [Fisch 1966 ] has underscored the full importance of the ternary tables that appear in the LN (340v, 341r, 341v, 342r, 344r), the first ones in the history of logic to try to formalize a modal triadic calculus (see also [Oostra 2007] ). Between October 1 and 4 1898, the LN includes another revealing example of such a translatability process (LN, 151r-166r ). Peirce's first sentence is colorful:
I am writing in this book, not this time parce que j'ai quelque chose de nouveux [sic] à laquelle je veux fixer la date, mais simplement parce que le papier que j'ai commandé pour écrire mon histoire de la science n'étant pas venu, je m'occupe cependant en faisant des notes pour un traité de logique. (151r) The student of the LN thanks the mention to the book, and the declaration that Peirce writes on it in order to fix novelties. Peirce's student smiles at the lack of adequate paper, an intrusion of chance which transforms the action. The student of thought marvels at Peirce's desire to write a treatise of logic, just not to lose his time. But, above all, what thoroughly strikes us is the continuous change of language in the first fragment of the sentence. Without forewarning marks, Peirce's mind imagines fragments of space ("book" -"papier"), time neighborhoods ("this time" -"la date") and activities ("writing" -"quelque chose de nouveux"), that only afterwards get transposed to a given language. Even if Peirce had already proposed multiple classification patterns, those essays were long and artificial. It is remarkable that the very heart of the "perennial classification" occurs, instead, compactly presented in the LN five years before.
Apparently, a visual perception of the classification (a typically Peircean activity that Kent resumes in her analysis) is combined in October 1898 with its French expression, an unexpected weaving which yields an evident simplification in its orderly presentation. Comte's typological clearness, or the French inheritance around "distinct reasons", may have exerted then a benefic action on Peirce's somewhat profuse and never-ending English. Translation and transformation, forcing him to think from the verso, crystallizes in this occasion in a pearl of elegant concision.
